THE NEW REPUBLIC

Secretary of State

When he was asked by President Truman to serve as Secretary of State, Dean Acheson has recalled, he first proferred a modest disclaimer: he could hardly fill the boots of General Marshall. "The President replied that without doubt there were people in the country more capable of being Secretary of State than I was, and more capable of being President than he was. The fact of the matter, however, was that he was President and he wanted me to be Secretary of State. It seemed a waste of time to talk about that any further." The relationship between a President and his principal Cabinet officer is, as Mr. Acheson has emphasized, an "intensely personal" one. In the case of the next President, one so intent on keeping the reins of foreign policy in his own hands, his range of choice for a Secretary of State is limited to a relatively few qualified men who, like Mr. Kennedy, have shown their capacity to understand the world not only as it was, but as it was becoming. During the pre-convention months and in the campaign itself, there were many efforts to extract from the Democratic nominee the identity of his probable Secretary. The persistence of the question seemed to suggest that no candidate for President could be finally judged without knowing how he would fill this one office, and use it if elected. But for Senator Kennedy to have pledged his word in advance on this appointment would have given the prospective appointee great leverage with the President: a contract would have been made between the President and the voters. The candidate wisely preserved his freedom of choice. Asked during the fourth TV debate to name "four men, each of whom, if appointed, would serve with distinction in your judgment as the Secretary of State, he replied that "the President bears the Constitu-

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Misjudging the Winner

★ The election was so close almost anything explains it. We think it happened in two of the "debates": once when cameras turned cruel eyes on sweating Nixon, wetting his lips while Kennedy spoke, once when in the final meeting they shifted to Kennedy, frankly laughing as Nixon tried to lecture him. Neither lasted 10 seconds. Not a word said either time. But they decided an election.

European press comment during the election struck us as dreadfully superficial. There was a bored attitude that Americans were wasting their time; that Kennedy and Nixon were essentially alike, and pretty inferior. Even the London *Economist* fell into this mood. Of all people the British – who saw Churchill trying to rouse the nation under Stanley Baldwin – should know better. Of many who have underestimated Kennedy perhaps the European press may be the last.

We have watched, traveled with and sometimes talked to Kennedy, for 10 months. We size him up as quite important. He is a young man who knows what he wants and how to go after it, and we think he has personal power. He knows, for example, the difference between a "weak" and a "strong" President. He specifically told the National Press Club here, January 14, that if elected he would be the latter. As Chief Executive, he said, he would use "the fullest powers of his office, all that are specified – and some that are not."

Other things stand out. This election ends the Protestant Succession. Some of us may regret it but it had to come. The later immigrants, the new ethnic groups, the other religions, sooner or later had to burst through the unwritten barriers that gave them inferior status. It may be tough on Nordic Protestants but the time to do something about it was the day before yesterday, when cheap immigration was being encouraged by the ancestors of the very people who deplore the results now.

Another thing is Kennedy's youth. At 43 he could be Eisenhower's son. The oldest President in history is being succeeded by the youngest. Is this bad? Not necessarily, though sometimes Kennedy's self-confidence startles us a bit. But the older generation of leaders is passing, look at them – Eisenhower, Macmillan, de Gaulle, Adenauer, Khrushchev. It is not a bad thing that a new generation, born in this century, should take over. Kennedy is the first, that is all.

When a new President takes office he is given certain counters to play with. They are counters of popularity and it is like a game. The new President's place in history depends on how he "spends" them. Both Kennedy and Nixon overpromised themselves in the campaign. Like every other man who came to the office, Kennedy has more IOU's outstanding than he can meet. He can put his counters on one objective but then he will have fewer for another. Suppose he takes a big pile and uses them to get a bill passed on civil rights. In all probability he can put such a bill through. But it will irritate the South; he will have fewer counters to spend, say, on some needed foreign affairs legislation. There are never enough counters.

They Still Like Ike

★ The amazing thing about Eisenhower is that at the end of his eight years he is just about as popular as when he started. He has made almost no enemies. He is unique in history in this. He never spent his counters; he hoarded them.

We wonder what will happen to Nixon? If you were awake at 3 a.m., EST, on the day after the election you saw him on television make his adieu. It is an opportunity afforded every loser and Nixon made his qualified concession of defeat gracefully and good naturedly.

Yet what if history had gone the other way? Nixon made a series of really extraordinary last minute, foreign affairs promises, each with a gimmick. On October 14 he promised to call a series of inter-allied meetings if elected. (Earlier he announced he would summon men of good will to form a series of commissions to help him set his course.) Again, on October 27 he promised personally to tour all of the satellite countries in Eastern Europe to "carry the message of freedom into the Communist world." How would he have got in? It was as though a mad public relations man had studied Eisenhower's 1952 pledge to visit Korea, and multiplied it.

Nor was this all. In his strangest and final proposal, November 6 (at Los Angeles), he solemnly proposed to send Eisenhower, with Herbert Hoover and Harry Truman (what a combination!) to Eastern European countries "to carry the idea of freedom." He described his announcement "as the most important half hour of the campaign."

It is extraordinary to note how seriously newspapers took these gimmicks. The trade publication, *Editor & Publisher*, said that of 939 daily newspapers, 731 editorially supported Nixon's candidacy. But even a paper that backed Kennedy, the *New York Times*, for example, gave this Nixon salvo page one, column eight, treatment. It is too bad that Nixon lost, in a way, so we cannot see the sequel of these elegant fantasies.

Rockefeller Next?

★ As this dispatch is written, after an all-night vigil, word has just come, past all uncertainty, that Kennedy is elected. But we never expect to hear the last explanation of why Nixon lost. Senator Goldwater was the first Old Guard leader to cry, "I told you so," and to taunt poor Nixon for having been inadequately conservative.

We guess that Rockefeller could have won. Sometime last week, somewhere in New York (in the blur of events we can't for our life remember where!) we asked the Governor if he would be a candidate in 1964? Rocky smiled amiably and observed that, as of the moment, he couldn't think beyond November 8. Well, the deadline has passed and the bitter fight has started over Eisenhower's estate. We suspect Nixon is out for good. And we just hazard a guess that if the agreeable Governor can only get himself re-elected in New York he will keep a sharp eye on 1964.

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Secretary of State

tional responsibility, not the Secretary of State, for the conduct of foreign affairs. Some Presidents have been strong in foreign policy; others have relied heavily on the Secretary of State. . . . I have been a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I have run for the Presidency with the full knowledge that his great responsibility, really given to him by the Constitution and by the force of events, is in the field of foreign affairs."

The answer was sound in all respects but one. It implied, probably unintentionally, a contradiction between the full exercise of Presidential leadership in foreign affairs and considerable reliance on a strong Secretary of State. Woodrow Wilson made the two mutually exclusive. So did Franklin Roosevelt. But Theodore Roosevelt, with Elihu Root, did not. And Harry Truman, with Mr. Acheson, found that a forceful Chief Executive and a forceful Secretary of State could work well together.

It seems to us most likely that the next Secretary of State will be one of seven men. Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson, as long-time Democratic spokesmen on international affairs and as the President-elect's campaign advisers, are the subject of most speculation. There are others, however, whose claims are being pressed by admirers and who are authoritatively said to be under consideration at Hyannis Port. One is David K. E. Bruce, former Ambassador to France and Germany. Others are World Bank President Eugene Black; Sen. J. W. Fulbright; Dean Rusk, President of the Rockefeller Foundation; and the former chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze. Each would admirably fill high places in a Kennedy Administration. The decision now before Mr. Kennedy – perhaps the most important of many decisions he immediately faces – is how to allocate this embarrassment of riches. It is a decision on which intangibles bear heavily – temperamental compatibility, for one – and because of this no one dare say dogmatically that one and only one candidate for Secretary of State would do credit to the next Administration. One can comment, though, on the tangibles involved. All these men are in many significant matters known quantities. Their records reveal the degree of their intellectual compatibility with the next President, the degree to which each, over the past decade, has shared Kennedy's vision of this "world of change . . . new problems, undreamt challenges, unanticipated opportunities." In particular, one can discern who has or has not favored "pro-American" nobodies to neutralist somebodies; who has or has not chosen Westernized business and bureaucratic elites abroad as his preferred clients, as against those often seedy local politicians who talk the language of anti-colonialism but not the language of Washington cocktail parties; who

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has or has not sensed the terms on which this country's partnership in the 60's with the new, emerging powers might be strengthened.

A Europe-Centered Secretary

David K. E. Bruce merits consideration at the outset because his candidacy has acquired a measure of behind-the-scenes support which is in surprisingly inverse ratio to his familiarity to the public. It is a tribute to Mr. Bruce that so many who worked with him in the Truman-Acheson era should nominate him, so to speak, as their favorite for the post. First of all, he looks the part. Theodore H. White drew his portrait as Ambassador to France (1949-52) thus: "Bruce and his startlingly handsome second wife dressed as Queen and Knave of Spades at a Paris charity masquerade; Bruce dressed in green knickers out hunting with the President of France (he set the diplomatic record with a bag of 99 pheasants in a single day); Bruce kissing village mayors on the cheek, praising them for their local beauties or local wines; Bruce presiding over ballet openings or art showings, was the story-book ambassador in the flesh." Mr. Bruce is a diplomat's diplomat. He has many friends on Capitol Hill – including Republicans (he was the only Democrat to get a key appointment – the Bonn Embassy – under Eisenhower) and influential Southerners. He is an intelligent Virginia gentleman who has moved throughout a cosmopolitan life in the higher echelons of finance (he was married to Andrew Mellon's daughter, Alissa, for 20 years). In all his public service, beginning with wartime intelligence work as OSS director in the European Theater, he has shown a talent for tough negotiation and a willingness to fight hard in behalf of large causes. David Bruce, for example, warmed quickly to the Schuman Plan conception of Jean Monnet and gave it the same single-minded support he was to give (together with Dwight Eisenhower) to the ill-fated, US-sponsored dream of a European Defense Community.

As Secretary, Mr. Bruce would symbolize to the world a Europe-centered foreign policy. In the unhappy and muddled sequence of events which led to Dienbienphu, for example, he strongly supported the French Government's view not only in public, which one would have expected of an envoy to the Quai D'Orsay, but in private. To this day, though he grants that US policy in Indo-China was inadequate, he holds to his conviction that a pro-French policy was the only workable one. His testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 20, 1951, is replete with admiration for General de Lattre de Tassigny, and with Mr. Bruce's disdain for those many critics of French policy who said that to assume the burden of colonialism was to assume its guilt and its ultimate defeat. France, he explained, remained in Indo-China because of the noblest anti-Communist motives. The Indo-Chinese, he thought, wanted the French to stay, and in any case, "if one wants to look at this thing realistically, I think that you would very quickly come to the belief, or adopt the thesis, that the Indo-Chinese – and I am speaking now of the Vietnam . . . the anti-Communist group – will have to show a far greater ability to live up to the obligations of nationhood before it will be safe to withdraw, whether it be the French Union forces or any other foreign forces, from that country." Those who had doubts were dismissed by Mr. Bruce as "obtuse." Sen. Theodore F. Green quietly interjected that "we have succeeded in identifying ourselves with French colonial ambitions in the minds of the natives – that pertains not only to Indo-China but to all of the Far East." "That, I hear," said Mr. Bruce, "is the thesis of Nehru. I question it. His philosophy is that it is better to have, as I understand it, a country in the Far East taken over by the Communists than it is to have any support to nationalists from an army of European troops fighting against the Communists." That was not, of course, Nehru's philosophy, nor precisely that of Mr. Kennedy, who, on his return from a Far East tour at that time said over the Mutual Network on November 14, 1951: "In Indo-China we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang onto the remnants of empire. . . . To check the Southern drive of Communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong, native non-Communist sentiment within those areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre." In this critical instance, Mr. Bruce did not show himself to be a prescient analyst. And since one of the most urgent and sensitive problems before the new Administration is the Algerian crisis, and all its related effects on Western unity and the future of US relations with the newly-independent nations, this alone seems reason enough to question Mr. Bruce's suitability for the Secretaryship.

The case for Eugene Black appears sounder than that of Mr. Bruce because the World Bank President knows his way around the capitals of Asia and Africa. But his popularity there is largely among a small number of financiers and bureaucrats. He is our number one salesman for private enterprise. He has repeatedly taken a "go slow" line with economic planners in less developed countries, who consider their countries are going too slow as it is. The World Bank under his direction has held back on loans for the public development of heavy industry, which has meant, in India, for instance, that projected fertilizer plants needed to increase agricultural production have not got beyond the blueprint stage, in some cases, for nearly a decade. Many Bank loans have been made conditional, in effect, on a country's willingness to choose private as against public

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investment, which is to say, on changes in the declared public policy of the countries concerned. Mr. Black has consequently been charged with unnecessarily meddling in other people's internal affairs. The charges have been justified. And critics of his "banker mentality" are not reconciled by being told, in his defense, that, relying as the Bank does on large-scale support from the private capital market, Mr. Black has done what he had to do.

Unlike Mr. Bruce, who is a fairly vigorous 62, Eugene Black at the same age only weeks ago underwent prolonged treatment at the Mayo Clinic. Like Secretary Herter, he would not bring great physical stamina to the job. Nevertheless, his name must be taken into account if only because, whatever his reputation abroad, he has a high reputation here; because he and the Kennedys have been social friends for many years; and because certain mutual friends (such as Atlanta lawyer Robert Troutman, a Kennedy lieutenant in Georgia) are reportedly keen on his appointment.

Senator Fulbright is tainted by his Arkansas record on racial matters (he signed the Southern Manifesto and filed a Supreme Court brief as *amicus curiae* in the Little Rock case), but there is doubt whether this would either prevent his confirmation as Secretary of State or his eventual acceptance elsewhere. The Senator has been forced to trade his integrity on civil rights for the opportunity to make what has been an enlightened contribution in foreign affairs. He spoke out forthrightly against many of the blunders of the Dulles era (notably the Baghdad Pact, the Aswan Dam cancellation, and the Lebanon landings) at the time they were being made. He has shown no great ability as a negotiator in Senate politicking, but as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee his administrative performance has, by all accounts, been adequate.

Dean Rusk served in a variety of high State Department posts for six years (1946-51) and has been tested under fire. As Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (1950-51) he had much to do with the critical decision first to resist the Communist attack in Korea, and then to prevent its expanding into a full-scale war with Communist China. His writings and public statements reveal the rigorous and yet imaginative intellect of a scholar (he was the President of Mills College before entering wartime government service). Though, like Bruce, an intimate member of the Acheson State Department high command which collectively embraced the pro-French line on Indo-China, Rusk in his public comments at the time saw the situation whole. Testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee on August 7, 1951, he spoke of the "extremely complicated" interplay between "the French on the one side, the non-Communist nationalists on the other, and the very active Communist opposition as a third part to the problem." In response to Henry Cabot Lodge, who asked whether the French "have not given the Indo-Chinese what amounts to their independence now," Rusk replied that while the French "have made up their minds that . . . Indo-China will be independent . . . on the other hand, it is quite fair to say that there are a great many people in Indo-China who do not believe that is the case, and who are suspicious of French long-range intentions, and that factor has made it difficult for the non-Communist nationalists." Mr. Lodge pressed further: "Regardless of what people may believe is the fact, is it not that this is no longer a colonial war?" But Rusk persisted: "I think that it is one thing to say that this is not a colonial war because the governments concerned have made the necessary decisions to settle that problem. It is another thing to say that the people who are fighting in this war think it is not a colonial war."

Mr. Rusk as President of the Rockefeller Foundation and as one of the drafters of the Rockefeller reports has given special study to the organizational problems of the federal government in foreign relations, as well as to broad policy problems. He neither overestimates nor underestimates what US policy can do. ("When the emphasis of discussion falls too heavily for my taste upon the limitations on policy," he wrote recently in *Foreign Affairs*, "I recall from early childhood the admonition of the circuit preacher: 'Pray as if it were up to God; work as if it were up to you'.") And he has a gift for winning appreciation in both liberal and conservative political environments without the sacrifice of his personal convictions. In his Congressional appearances as Assistant Secretary, for example, he was unusually well-received. Georgia-born, of humble parents, he has a down-to-earth side to his personality which contrasts with the cool matter-of-factness of Paul Nitze. Both of them are known as competent administrators. Mr. Nitze's interests, however, have of late centered on military policy, and he might, therefore, most usefully contribute to the Kennedy Administration in the Pentagon. There he could bring his sophisticated grasp of international problems to the formulation of broad national security policy – serving as a link between the State Department planners and the generals.

Bowles and Stevenson

What about Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson?

One must pause to consider more precisely two questions: what was John Kennedy's campaign essentially about, and, what kind of Secretary of State does 1961 require? The campaign was one long attack on second-best. Mr. Kennedy said our prestige had slumped, our power had slumped, our confidence in our purposes and capacities had slumped, and that we need to make a new beginning. He identified himself with a progressive

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image of America. He spoke of the inseparability of national power and peace, and he dedicated himself to the advancement of both. He said these things not only to voters in Illinois and California, but to a world much of which has grown skeptical of the competence of our diplomacy. By his choice of Secretary, Mr. Kennedy will signal to every nation just what this young, pragmatic new leadership can be expected to mean.

The President and his Secretary must, as has been said, be temperamentally and intellectually compatible, yet compatibility is not the only requisite. For one thing, the Secretary must be an able administrator. He will be running a massive bureaucracy (23,455 employees, including a Foreign Service now grown to 6,449). In the long historic past, the Secretary was mainly concerned in the treaty-making process. Now, he is continuously involved in questions of how much of our resources we are going to divert from domestic requirements and how we shall allocate them among competing demands on the foreign scene. This requires his continuous interposition here at home in dealing with the Congress, in articulating our problems and needs and purposes to the public, in keeping an eye upon the multifarious departments concerned in foreign policy, and in maintaining close junction with the President. He is the President's political vicar, his right arm in bringing order and direction to the various departments and agencies of the government in foreign affairs – as well as having responsibilities for roving, negotiating and exchanging views through direct contact with emissaries in Washington and at foreign capitals.

Above all, a Secretary of State appropriate to the 60's must have a wide, detailed and seasoned understanding of an incredible number of dissimilar problems – in West Berlin, in Laos, in Cuba, in the Congo. He must be a creditable spokesman for peace, one who does not confuse strength with moral pronouncements or provocative gestures. His grasp of Communist aims and tactics must be sophisticated and his opposition to Communist expansion firm, yet he must make it plain that he does not think the cold war pattern of the past decade is unalterable, or that hot war is inevitable. He must be at home with the Nkrumahs and Nehrus, as well as the de Gaulles; he must respect rather than simply tolerate reformers; he must accept and work with the neutralists without dismay; he must have an instinctive sympathy for the efforts to use government as an instrument for national planning. Only this kind of man will be effective as a diplomat on the technical level and make a convincing case – to a foreign as well as domestic constituency – for US policies.

It is here that Bowles and Stevenson are in a class apart. Each fits the bill. And whatever new departures are developed by a Kennedy Administration, Bowles or Stevenson as Secretary would automatically assure them a larger measure of acceptance abroad than were they to be put forward by others not so respected.

Most people remember that Mr. Bowles was one of Senator Kennedy's early supporters; his pre-convention efforts helped attract many to Kennedy who trusted Bowles' long record of liberal leadership. One easily forgets how alone Mr. Bowles was in 1951 when he argued that neutralism was often another word for nationalism and that the US would be wise to deal with it as a deeply-rooted reality rather than an immoral threat. (One month ago Dwight Eisenhower, with the zeal of the new convert, went so far as to *urge* neutralism on the new African states.) Reading back over the speeches and writings of Mr. Bowles beginning in 1946, and in more recent years of Mr. Stevenson, one is struck by their far-sightedness, their sense of the drift of history as well as their confidence that the free world need not drift and that history could be bent to democratic purposes.

In 1946 Bowles was advocating that "all nations should have access to American capital for the development of power and transportation systems, irrigation projects and modern industries. The expenditure of two percent of our gross national income . . . would in 10 years' time substantially increase the living standard of hundreds of millions of people." In 1951 and 1952, he was pleading with Washington to recognize the impending shift in Soviet strategy from military aggression to the primacy of economic and political penetration (executive session testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 16, 1952, is a notable case in point). In 1954, after a visit to Japan, he wrote that "when we ask them to rearm, nearly half the country disagrees. . . . Japan is an uncertain quantity with strong contradictions which may soon come to the surface dramatically." In 1955 and again in his 1956 book, *Africa's Challenge to America*, Bowles offered explicit country-by-country examples of the "explosive" inadequacies of US policy. His three, extended study tours since relinquishing his Ambassadorship to India in 1953 have taken him to 32 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe; his two-month tour of Yugoslavia, Poland and the Soviet Union in January and February of 1957 included one of the first (and least publicized) interviews with Mr. Khrushchev. Last year, as a member of the Europe Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, he conferred with leaders in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

An All-Star Cast

Adlai Stevenson, too, is prepared. He has trained himself for large responsibilities as thoroughly as any prospective Secretary of State in memory. He was chief of the Economic Mission to Italy in 1943 and of a War Department mission to Europe a year later. He was head of the US delegation to the Preparatory Commis-

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sion for the UN in 1945, and later a member of the UN delegation to the General Assembly. He was an excellent Governor of a large state. He, too, has crisscrossed the globe. There are not many leaders on any continent – in or out of power – with whom he has not conferred. His appointment calendar since 1953 (some 40-odd heads of states and high officials of other countries have made the pilgrimage to Libertyville) illustrates the unique esteem in which he is held. He has twice been the candidate of his party for the Presidency. He has gone up and down the land working for the election of John Kennedy with a diligence and enthusiasm not exceeded by any other campaigner.

But alike as their thinking is, these two men have radically different styles. A Stevenson regime at the State Department would have more old-school elegance. It would also have a responsive, even an enthusiastic audience abroad. Initially at least, Chester Bowles would bring slightly less prestige to the position. His special strength is as an experienced administrator (in organizing his own business, as head of the wartime OPA and as Governor of Connecticut). He is a man of action, and the Department of State under his direction would get a welcome infusion of energy, new ideas and new talents.

The President-elect will soon decide where these men and others can best serve. The Secretary of State is only one of many highly important positions that must shortly be filled. A strong Ambassador to NATO is badly needed, such a man as Dean Acheson. A hard-driving and far-seeing coordinator of our Foreign Aid Programs is needed. A negotiator who can make a fresh start on disarmament negotiations and on a nuclear test ban is needed. An Ambassador at the UN who can inspire confidence and who does not equate debating points with accomplishment is needed. The margin of the President-elect's victory is narrow and the pressures on him to conciliate the South and the Republicans will be heavy. Nevertheless, he is in command, and he is fortunate; he can assemble an all-star cast in foreign affairs. A President who himself is dedicated to new departures can only welcome the intimate counsel of such exceptionally able men.

Widening the Narrow Margin

It was a close thing all the way. It seems clear enough that John F. Kennedy alone among the Democratic aspirants could have turned the trick. It is clear enough that he could not have done it without the assistance of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson as his running mate. (It is equally clear that he could not have done it without notably solid Negro support in key states of North and South alike.) It is doubtful that he could have prevailed had Nelson Rockefeller been his adversary. The combination that was realized was probably the only one susceptible of being turned into a Democratic victory.

The winning candidate's coat-tails proved scanty. Save in two or three Northeastern states he ran generally behind his ticket. For the second time in a century the party winning the Presidency incurred net losses in the Senate and the House. They were too slight to imperil the party's nominal control in either Chamber, yet that strength was eroded in victory. In the House, at least, diminution is significant both qualitatively and quantitatively. Representatives Frank Coffin of Maine, George McGovern of South Dakota, and Lee Metcalf of Montana – stalwarts who tried with varying success for other offices – will be sorely missed. Fortunately, such valuable House members as Richard Bolling, Stewart Udall, Sidney Yates, John Brademas and Thomas Ashley were returned.

The outcome was far closer than appeared to be likely only a week or 10 days before election day. It was in that last phase that the Republicans turned to uninhibited demagoguery. The tactic seems to have proved productive, even if not completely successful, and the lesson is probably not lost on the practitioners. The temptation to resume the drumfire of extreme partisanship against the victor may be irresistible. New Presidents traditionally enjoy a honeymoon period of at least 90 days. Senator Kennedy has often referred to this expectation. He may be fortunate to find one that will endure a week. The results presumably leave Richard Nixon as a political force of sorts for the time being at least.

The effect of the candidate's Catholicism helped in some states. It hurt in some others. On balance it probably did him more benefit than harm. The point, however, remains a sensitive one. It may vanish from political discourse for a time, but it will remain latent in many minds. How to allay the religious issue must be the subject of much quiet counsel.

Senator Kennedy must strive to enclose his adversaries by raising political discourse to better and higher levels. This means that as President-elect and then as President he must henceforth speak more informatively and more creatively then he chose to do in the campaign. We are not criticizing his tactics as campaigner. We seek only to suggest that he must now unfold and explain his thoughts and purposes with greater care and in greater depth. His habitual resort to idioms of speed and motion will not be enough in the months ahead. He must find in himself resources for discourse to match the seriousness and intricacy of the true issues. He has won, but narrowly. Now he must widen his margins, and to do this he must broaden his range of communication with the people. His mandate is not clear enough. Now he must strive to create one, and, like Andrew Jackson, who barely squeaked through, act as if he had won handsomely.

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Osborn Says Farewell to the 1960 Campaign



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Bringing Asia Policy Up to Date

China's Pull Is Strong But Not Irresistible

by Denis Warner

Now that the campaign is over, it may be possible to begin a rational discussion of what and how the United States has been doing in Asia, thus perhaps getting a more sharply focused picture of how we might do better. The US has based its response to the Communist challenge in Asia on the premise that that challenge is primarily, if not exclusively military – a response traceable in large part to the Korean War. That conflict hardened our conviction that Communism could be contained in Asia, and elsewhere, by a chain of interlocking global bases, military alliances and substantial US-armed and equipped regional military forces. Economic aid to underdeveloped countries was not overlooked; but the emphasis was heavily on "defense."

Thus, in progressive stages after 1950, we saw the creation in Korea of an army of 630,000; the transformation, under the protection of the 7th Fleet, of an army of similar size in Formosa; and in Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Thailand, the outpourings of hundreds of millions of dollars to produce a series of armies totalling approximately 350,000 men to match the Viet Cong (Vietminh). The Republic of Korea, Japan, Nationalist China and the Philippines all become formal allies of the United States through bilateral treaties of mutual defense. The eight-power Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) brought Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand into an alliance with the US, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand, it threw a "mantle of protection" over the protocol States of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam, and, through Pakistan, linked SEATO with the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which in its turn, was linked through Turkey to NATO. Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines became forward American military bases. In the South Korean outpost, two divisions of American ground forces buttressed the ROK's 18 divisions; and the American "presence" on Formosa served notice on the Communists that the island was not for Peking's taking.

Let me give my opinion right at the start on this assumption that the Communists would not hesitate to use military force to achieve their ends if they were not opposed by adequate deterrent power: it was correct. To the extent that it deterred Communist aggression in Asia and stiffened regional determination to resist, US policy succeeded, and it is not in any way exaggerating the importance of the American role to say that but for it most of Asia would have already passed under Communist rule.

So much for the past. Now let us try and see whether the policies we have heretofore followed are or promise to be sufficient for the future. With the outstanding exception of Malaya, which is remote from the main concentrations of Communist Far Eastern strength, and whose internal security, in any case, has not been directly dependent on the United States, there are few economically viable and almost no politically stable states in the ranks of all Western-allied, or protected, nations in the region. The forlorn hope of the late Mr. Dulles that Communist China would collapse from internal revolt is now a water-logged lifebuoy, clung to in desperation only by those made blind by the will to believe. Mutual security aid, as many knew long before *The Ugly American* dramatized it, has often been a stop-gap, and sometimes a means by which corrupt regimes have discredited both themselves and the "free" world. In some cases, the armies created were too big for the American-insured, local economies to support. In others, little Frankensteins arose who threatened by their own irresponsible adventures to sabotage vital American interests. While Syngman Rhee ruled South Korea, for instance, there was always the danger he would provoke an incident leading to renewed warfare with the North. By deploying a third of his effective forces in the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, Chiang Kai-shek has staked his claim to sovereignty over all China; but he has also exposed the United States to involvement on the mainland, under circumstances that many other Asian countries regard as indefensible. The hard core of both the South Korean and Chinese Nationalist armies are first-rate. But the South Koreans are so badly paid that they have been forced into open black-marketeering of their American supplies and equipment; the Nationalist Chinese forces contain much dead-wood that cannot now be cut out without hurting thousands of mainlanders who accompanied Chiang Kai-shek to Formosa.

The Laotian Army for several years drew rations for 25,000 while its true strength was substantially lower,

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the difference being pocketed by corrupt officials. Against even the mild challenge posed by the Communist Pathet Lao a year ago, the Laotian Army proved ineffective. Only partly trained, unstable and now frustrated and fragmented, it failed to provide security, or a sense of security, and by its undisciplined and parasitical behavior directly helped the Communist cause, turning thousands of villagers against the Royal Lao Government.

Fears and Phobias

Experience in Cambodia has not been much happier. Again the United States picked up the bill for the Army, leaving the French responsible for its training. At no time, however, has Cambodia regarded itself either as in the Western camp, or even as anti-Communist. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, its sensitive and not always responsible leader, believes that time favors the Communists. He wants no part of SEATO's "mantle of protection" and is beset by fears, mostly imaginary, of South Vietnam and Cambodia, his pro-Western neighbors. In his quest for more modern weapons to ensure that these neighbors treat him with respect, he is now hinting broadly that Russia and Communist China will be glad to oblige.

All of this has left South Vietnam, with its Army of 150,000 American-trained and equipped forces, more exposed to infiltration and subversion from North Vietnam. The pro-Communist Viet Cong (Vietminh) guerrillas are operating in increasing numbers in South Vietnam, using techniques that brought the French Union forces to desperation and final defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954: against them the more orthodox tactics of the South Vietnamese Army have not to date proved spectacularly successful.

So far as our military bases in Asia are concerned, that they helped to keep the peace is demonstrable. But it is much less certain whether their long-range value will not be vitiated by the fears and phobias they have helped to breed. A foreign military base is of established value if it serves as a deterrent against major war, provides a brigade station for brush fire wars and a sense of security for the inhabitants of the host country. It is not sufficient that a base should help assure the security of the United States: it must also satisfy its hosts that *their* security is assured. When the local population has reason to fear that the base is so exposed as to be indefensible and calculated only "to draw the crabs," the law of diminishing returns quickly applies, especially where the situation demands not only the effective use of the base but the allegiance and friendship of the country concerned.

Japan, of course, is the most interesting case in point. The official US view in Tokyo of the riots in May and June is that Japanese disapproval of US bases has been exaggerated. The by-elections that followed the cancellation of the Eisenhower visit, and which returned members of ex-Premier Kiski's party with increased majorities, are used to defend this view. The argument is partly self-delusion. If the Japanese voted for the Liberal Democratic Party and the prosperity they associate with its rule and not against the security treaty (opposition to which is about all the socialists had to offer) it does not necessarily mean that the "United States lost the Kishi Cabinet and the Eisenhower visit, but won the battle of the bases," which is the way one American official described it when I was in Tokyo.

"We've got 10 years plus one under the treaty, and that's as far as anyone can expect to look ahead in these times," said the official, reflecting the current optimism. Even the left-wing, it is said, would have greeted President Eisenhower with warmth and friendliness if there had been a moderately successful Summit meeting and he had then gone on, as planned, through the Soviet Union to Japan. The U-2 incident and the Russian and Chinese exploitation of it for propaganda purposes, the demonstrable unpopularity of Kishi with the Japanese people, the hang-over of anti-Americanism due to some unfortunate earlier base incidents, and difficulties arising over Okinawa, where the continued American administration is regarded by many Japanese as a violation of Japan's "residual sovereignty" in the Ryukus – all these, say American officials, combined to produce a set of unfavorable circumstances which are unlikely to recur.

Moreover, the virtual disappearance of American ground forces in Japan, it is claimed, has eliminated one possible source of friction. Premier Ikeda and his Ministers are said to be untainted by past associations with the militarists, and therefore more acceptable to current Japanese sentiment; and, above all, there is scarcely a man or woman in Japan who does not live better and eat better because of the country's close economic ties with the United States.

Now, there is validity in the arguments that: (a) The main concentration of Communist power in the Far East is immediately behind the Japanese islands in Siberia, North Korea and Manchuria and that therefore Japan and its bases are an invaluable shield for North America; (b) the naval bases are essential for the maintenance of the US 7th Fleet, which, deprived of their use, would be gravely weakened by the absence of any suitable alternative advanced bases; (c) the Japanese air bases provide room for deployment and thereby make possible the continued security of the American positions in Korea and Okinawa, which would otherwise be exposed and highly vulnerable; (d) Japan is the US military workshop in Asia, and there is no other.

It is also true that optimism about the treaty is shared, publicly at least, by the Japanese Government. The Foreign Minister, who is the product of a

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rich family background and an early interest in Marxism (which have combined in middle age to produce an attachment to what he calls "new capitalism," with the accent on social welfare, a firm belief in close relations with the West and a desire to do business with the Communists), blames the midsummer demonstrations on the Russians and Chinese, on the Japanese tendency to become quickly tired of their governments, on the failure of the Kishi Administration to recognize the need for proper public relations, and on the activities of a small Left minority. He implies that the majority now knows where its bread and butter comes from, that all is well with Japan, with the security treaty, with the bases and with Japan's relations with the United States. It is a comforting impression, but it is not the whole truth.

Though the Communists certainly exploited the situation in Japan to their own ends in May and June, the feeling against the treaty is still widespread. Japanese youth, for instance, is almost totally anti-treaty, Japanese fathers who disapproved of the behavior of their sons and daughters during the riots told me that their wives were solidly for the demonstrators. This perhaps reflects the Japanese male's belief that no good will come of the way women are behaving these days. But it also suggests that the anti-war feeling, the real fear aroused by the U-2 fiasco, and general desire for withdrawal into a kind of neutralism are widespread enough to cause chaos if our bases were ever put to the test.

Furthermore, while the present Japanese Government is honestly determined, as Mr. Kosaka puts it, to stay on a peak with the West and not to descend into the valley between the two blocs, it is no less interested in establishing normal relations, especially trading relations, with Moscow and Peking. Of this, the Communists are well aware and Peking's wooing of Japan is becoming more ardent. During his visit to Tokyo in August, Mr. Liu Ning-I, Chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, had a long talk with Mr. Kenso Matsumura, leader of the anti-main current factions of the Liberal Democratic Party, in which he suggested that Sino-Japanese relations would improve if the Japanese Government refrained from (a) pursuing a policy hostile to China, (b) taking part in the "two Chinas plot" and (c) obstructing and sabotaging the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations. Liu added that after the abrogation of the security treaty, China and Japan could coexist peacefully and conclude a pact of mutual non-aggression.

The appeal did not fall on altogether deaf ears. The strong Japanese political desire to reach an understanding with China is powerfully supported by many industrialists who, incidentally, determine the weight of their contributions to the opposing Japanese political parties (including the Communists) according to their size and influence. And there has been a recent spate of departures from Japan for China and the Soviet Union.

In the pursuit of its objectives in Japan, China has two contradictory but nevertheless complementary methods of attack. The "hard" sell is the threat that American bases may involve Japan in a war with China, and this can be turned on and off while Chiang Kai-shek continues to fortify the offshore islands. The "soft" sell is the appeal that China holds out as a market for Japan's exploding industrial output.

Two years ago when Peking said it did not really want to take Quemoy, observers were inclined to scoff. But now that the island has been more heavily fortified and is better defended, the logic in Peking's disclaimer is clear. To have Quemoy would not advance its dedicated cause to drive the United States out of the West Pacific; not to have it provides an almost unlimited field for politico-military exploitation. The 700 guns the Communists have mounted on the Fukien coast may be pointed at Quemoy, but their shells will burst with greatest effect on the taut nerves of the Japanese. What happens in Japan produces an automatic reaction in Okinawa, and what happens in Japan and Okinawa directly relates to the continuing security of South Korea.

China and Her Neighbors

Whether the value of our defense treaty with Japan has passed the point of no return cannot be answered dogmatically. It is nevertheless clear that however devoutly we may desire a strongly anti-Communist Japan, unafraid of cocking its snook at the Communists, a friendly non-Communist Japan is probably the best we can hope for. And to maintain even this, it will be vital to avoid situations that give the appearance of compromising Japan against the judgment of its people.

The neutralization of the offshore islands is a priority need, not merely because they are a potential political liability to the United States in its vitally important relations with Japan, but also because they vitiate the efforts to find a solution to the Formosan Strait problem that does not involve either a sell-out or war. To Chiang, the islands are an insurance policy against any move toward the establishment of "two Chinas," which, though he doggedly refuses to accept it, provides the only real hope of Formosa's independent survival and the survival of traditional Chinese culture, with all that could mean in terms of the loyalties of millions of overseas Chinese.

The 7th Fleet, with its dual nuclear-conventional capabilities, has always been the main bulwark of Formosa's defense. Against the air and land power now available to Mao and the availability of huge fleets of junks, many of them motorized, to serve as troop transports, Formosa simply could not be held by the Nationalist forces alone. Nor is it conceivable that these forces alone will ever be sufficient for the task. Well,

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then, one may properly ask, what is the reason for so large a Nationalist Army? The answer is that this is the force which Chiang hopes will carry him back to the mainland in three to five years. It is the military substance of the political myth, and it drains the economy to such an extent that Formosa, if required to support a military machine of the present weight and size, is never likely to become a self-supporting state. Enlightened self-interest demands that Formosa be denied to the Communists, at least so long as that is the desire of the island's population, both Formosan and mainlander; but it also demands a facing of military, political and economic realities by the US.

Since Peking would react strongly to the *de facto* creation of "two Chinas," this move would not make US recognition of Communist China any more probable. The conditions for even a partial US-China rapprochement do not exist today and are unlikely to exist in the very near future. The Communist leaders are firmly committed to the destruction of American power and influence in Asia and in the rest of the underdeveloped world. The requirement, therefore, is not for an accommodation with China but for the reshaping of US policy in ways that promise the best long-term prospects of success for both the United States and its allies, and the Asian community in general.

This task is not so difficult as it might seem, for despite its maneuverings with Japan, its border agreement with Burma and its overtures to Cambodia, Communist China has reached a very low point in peripheral popular esteem. Its relations with many of its neighbors have so far deteriorated that a new Western approach might now produce surprisingly good results.

China's relations with Indonesia, for instance, have gone from bad to worse; while India, which for so long held out the hand of friendship, is heavily disillusioned. The Indian position is especially important, for it represents a marked narrowing of the gap between Asian – especially Indian – and Western – especially American – thought on China.

No review of the present position of the US in Asia can disregard, of course, the readiness with which the West has compromised its principles by permitting its Asian allies to use anti-Communism as a cover for other tyrannies. Regime after regime, closely identified with us in the "free" world, has in the name of freedom created a tragic impression among the uncommitted that the difference in police controls between the West and the Communist bloc is often only a matter of degree. This was true of the Rhee regime in South Korea. It is true, though less pronounced, of South Vietnam. It is true to some degree of Laos and Formosa.

It will be argued that it is improper for the US to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states. There are two answers to that: one is that interference in many forms goes on continuously, and the second is that any nation which wants to play the game of the "free" world should be required to comply with some of the basic rules. To oppose the tyranny of the Left by espousing a tyranny of the Right is no way to win respect in Asia.

Nor is economic stability to be found in societies which have drifted into the status of permanent mendicants. The time has come to rethink the whole question of economic aid. To cite one example of the distribution of aid funds, the ICA aid program for Korea in fiscal

Greater Deference to the Opinions of Asians

Even if the United States decides to move toward a "two Chinas" policy, it should not proceed unilaterally in this new course. What is needed, above all, is a basic decision that, instead of adopting rigid positions without consultation with others, the United States should actively explore, with all the major non-Communist countries on whom the future of Asia depends, the possibilities for finding broader ground for common action and cooperation. If the United States is wise and flexible enough to pay greater deference to the attitudes and opinions of these nations, they will almost certainly respond by showing a greater understanding of American purposes in Asia and an increased willingness to cooperate for common ends.

What is needed to meet the challenge of Communist China is, fundamentally, not so much an effective China policy as an effective Asia policy in the broader sense. In such a policy, the United States must make clear that, while continuing to maintain and strengthen the existing security structure in Asia, it is determined to do all it can to help all of the non-Communist states in the area, whether allied with the West or nonaligned, to build strong viable states. If this becomes the primary focus of policy, the situation in the Taiwan Strait and tactical issues such as recognition and China's seat in the United Nations will be seen in proper perspective.

– A. DOAK BARNETT, *Communist China and Asia*

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1960 came to $206,256,141, of which $197,874,141 went to "defense support." Now the definition of "defense support" is that "economic assistance which is required, in addition to any necessary military assistance, to make possible, or otherwise to obtain, contributions by the country to the common defense. The end result sought is the achievement of military objectives through economic benefits that provide support for the military establishment."

If the Communist threat in Asia had been temporary this overriding emphasis on "defense" might have been justified; but, as I have tried to indicate, it is neither temporary nor entirely military. Yet of the more than $2 billion in US economic aid to South Korea since 1945, less than $100 million has gone into aid of a type calculated to make the economy self-generating and eventually self-sufficient. This pattern of distribution holds true in most countries which are large recipients of US help. Since 1951, for instance, the Philippines have received $35.5 million under the heading of "technical cooperation" and $186.7 million in "defense support." In Formosa from 1951 to 1959, $709,964,000 from the US went to "defense support," $129,455,000 to direct forces support and only $15,502,000 for technical cooperation.

Aid designed to make a country militarily stronger should also have the effect of improving its general economic well-being, but the preferred policy of putting the military cart before the economic horse, of placing such emphasis on "salables" in the aid program (these accounted for $177.8 million of the "defense support" aid to South Korea in fiscal 1960) have failed both to produce economic stability, or to encourage the hope that such vast aid programs can ever be discontinued without causing political disaster.

The proposition heard in Washington that non-military foreign aid ought to come principally from private investment led to pathetic attempts to entice foreign investors to enter South Korea and Formosa. Did any responsible official seriously expect any response at all? Worthwhile private foreign investments seek political and economic security, which American aid in the Far East has not notably succeeded in creating.

Prices, Polytechnics, Population

In any new appraisal of US Asian policy, a first requirement, and one to which the West in general has never given the attention that it deserves, is the assurance to all the underdeveloped countries of minimum commodity price levels. No country can plan ahead on the boom or bust fluctuations that have occurred for years in the prices of rubber, tin, copra and other traditional products of the underdeveloped Far East. A second requirement is an all-embracing, but not necessarily costly, increase in technical aid. The shortage of skilled technicians, managers and civil servants in almost all these countries is of such magnitude as to defeat any economic aid program. It is pointless to assist people who don't know what to do with what they're given, and even the most modern factory with adequate raw materials to hand is unlikely to succeed if management and workers are unskilled. The answer does not lie in the extension of scholarships for foreign study, but rather in the creation and expansion of educational facilities in the countries concerned. Too often foreign-trained students are over-qualified for the posts available; many become frustrated; and others (this is especially true in the case of Formosa) don't return to their own countries at all. American aid to such institutions as the University of the Philippines, with an enrollment of about 16,000 and a faculty of 1,200, is an example of effective technical aid. A small and inexpensive school for training rural teachers outside Phnom Penh, in Cambodia, is another.

The need is not for Asian MIT's, but for large numbers of basic technical and administrative schools in which the external obligation need go no further than assistance with construction, the training of the teachers and some sort of supervisory eye on standards. These requirements may sound elementary. They are. But they are also the essential, and to a large extent neglected, pre-conditions for economic progress which, in turn, is the *sine qua non* for political stability.

Another much more controversial need is population control. The population of the world today is slightly less than 3 billion: by 1980, if present trends persist, it will be more than 4.25 billion. Thanks to improvements in medical care and skills, the death rate in the underdeveloped countries has fallen rapidly, while the birth rate has remained extremely high. By admittedly draconic methods, Japan has shown that family planning need not wait on improved living standards but can actually make an important contribution toward its achievement. The lesson is of particular significance in three areas of military importance to the United States – South Korea, Okinawa and Formosa.

A final requirement is an aid program on something like the scale envisaged by Barbara Ward, who believes that the United States alone should provide $3 billion a year, or 1 percent of its national income for five decades, and that other Western nations, many of which have been prone to criticize the US but singularly laggard in making meaningful donations themselves, ought to contribute proportionately.

What sort of Asian societies would evolve under the impact of the scheme I have outlined is not easy to predict. They would not all be patterned in our image. Some might not necessarily feel disposed to be "anti-Communist," or "on our side"; but the chances of their tying themselves to the coattails of the Russians or Chinese, would at least be minimized.

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Something of a Miracle

The quadrennial fourth-class miracle, in passing as these lines come under the reader's eye, may not be worth mentioning; yet its significance, rightly understood, overshadows that of any other news that may be carried in the morning newspapers.

Here is the miracle: this is written some days before the election of November 8, yet the practical result of that election can be predicted with absolute finality. The result will be the transfer of the most powerful political office on earth certainly from one man to another, perhaps from one party to another, without let or hindrance from any quarter.

"But that is according to the law as made and provided, so why not?" the typical American is likely to ask; and that is one thing wrong with the typical American as a political animal, because in the present state of the world there is every reason why not. Almost everywhere else in the world of today the law is as the bruised reed and the smoking flax of Scripture; only, or almost only in America, as Harry Golden would say, does the law retain mastery over the tank and the machine-gun of entrenched power, and over the dagger and bomb of the assassin.

Fourth-class? It is a third- or second-, very nearly a first-class miracle in the eyes of anyone who will give it thought. We are 180 million people, including at least the average proportion of romantics, fanatics and plain damn fools. More than that, in this specific campaign the usual emotionalism has been super-charged by the injection of an issue that historically has been potent to explode the most stolid of populations, to wit, disputes over religion.

Less than 15 years ago in India, that model of neutralism, 30,000 corpses littered the streets of Calcutta after religious disputes incidental to an impending transfer of political power. To assume that Catholic and Protestant in this country are less sincere in their faith than Moslem and Hindu would be insulting to Christianity; but political maturity here has put an end to the Holy War as a means of propagation of the Faith.

Yet in the face of a provocation that in times past has riven great empires we have conducted a plebiscite in which murder was not the determining, or even a perceptibly influential factor; and the result will be accepted with nothing more serious than a widespread explosion of profanity and perhaps an occasional fisticuff. Remarkable? Considering the times and the circumstances, it is miraculous!

Nevertheless, the political maturity of the American is as yet only half achieved. It will not be complete until it is conscious; for until the American realizes how advanced he is himself he will not be able to make a reasonable allowance for the relative immaturity of other people with whom he has to deal.

This does not apply exclusively to the man in the street. It applies even more closely to the man in the White House. Wilson and Roosevelt were certainly uncommon men; yet both unconsciously shared the common American's delusion that intellectual development necessarily implies equivalent political development; and this delusion betrayed both into grave errors in dealing with imperial Germany and Japan, and with Soviet Russia.

The same misconception led Truman and Acheson, and especially Eisenhower and Dulles, into many avoidable mistakes in foreign policy.

The decline in the prestige of the United States – actually, a spectacular decline in the world's faith in democracy – is not attributable, as Khrushchev says and perhaps really believes, to an ineradicable leaning toward tyranny and bad faith in the American system. It is due almost entirely to our inability to communicate to others our true beliefs; and that failure, in turn, is due to our insistence on lecturing in Latin to the kindergarten class.

A political tradition that began with the Magna Carta and has developed for 700 years cannot be transmitted to the Congolese in five easy lessons. So much, we are beginning to comprehend. But we have not mastered the idea that a people trained in self-government under such masters as Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson is, or ought to be, politically more mature than a people whose ablest mentor was Bismarck; and the fact that Germany, otherwise, is at least our intellectual equal is irrelevant.

This is not, in the circumstances, cause for self-congratulation. The impressive thing is not our superior grasp of political theory. Far more important is our monumental stupidity in not realizing what that superior grasp implies. It is sophomoric, with due attention to the basic meaning of "sophomore," which is "learned fool."

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The Build-Up for Hitler's War

by J. F. Golay

There is a moral in William Shirer's new history of the rise and fall of Hitler's Third Reich: no special providence guarantees the survival of democratic nations, however virtuous and strong they may be. With all their constitutional checks on the exercise of power, they can still be imperiled in a crisis by the mistakes of well-meaning but deluded leaders. Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister from 1937 to 1940 was such a leader.

The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
by William L. Shirer
(Simon & Shuster; $10)

Shirer's study supports what Sir Louis Namier pointed out in 1952 in *In The Nazi Era:* the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia at Munich did not result because Chamberlain, the dedicated man of peace, was reluctantly driven to it in his determination to avoid war at all costs, much less because he wanted to gain time to rearm Britain; Chamberlain had reckoned on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia all along. He had let Hitler know as early as November, 1937 that the British government would not object to territorial adjustments in central Europe if carried out "by reasonable agreements." In May 1938, a few weeks after the Austrian *Anschluss,* Chamberlain was already thrusting the British government forward as an unsought intermediary between Hitler and Benes and urging Hitler to state his terms for transmission to Prague. By the time of the autumn meetings at Godesberg and Munich, the only question at issue was not whether but how Germany should take the Sudeten lands. Hitler wanted to do it by force so that he could "crush"the Czechs, who had dared to mobilize against him. Chamberlain and Daladier had to head him off this tack, because they knew that even their appeasement-prone supporters at home would not swallow naked aggression.

Why did Chamberlain stubbornly persist in this course of action when, as we know now, the evidence before him that it must lead to damaging and perhaps fatal results for his country was overwhelming? Why did he ignore the advice and warnings of all the ablest and most experienced of his senior officials in the Foreign Office and the European capitals? Why did he discount intelligence reports of the strength of Czech preparations for war (even Hitler was shaken by the Czech fortifications when he finally saw them!) and of the relative unreadiness of the Germans? Why did he shrug off the overtures in London of the dissident German generals as "anti-Nazi propaganda"? How could he overlook the display of shiftiness which Hitler afforded him in their meetings?

Chamberlain failed to grasp these realities because he was the prisoner of an illusion. Like his father, he was convinced that lasting peace in Europe could be secured only by a fundamental accord between Great Britain and Germany. But the Anglo-German agreement sought by Joseph Chamberlain had eluded him and the first great war followed. Neville Chamberlain believed it was his mission, succeeding where his father had failed, to get a far-reaching agreement with Germany and secure lasting peace. Against all discouragements, he persisted. This illusory aim sent him back to Hitler again and again and accounted for the triumphant mood in which he returned to London from Munich. Daladier, who felt a decent shame at the plight in which the Czechs had been left, was by contrast utterly cast down. But Chamberlain had Hitler's signature on a promise never to go to war with Britain and genuinely believed that he had brought off his great stroke. It was "peace in our time." By the side of this, the Czech problem – that "quarrel in a faraway country between peoples of whom we know nothing" – was small.

It all but cost the British nation its existence. When he was finally driven from office as Prime Minister, the British were on the verge of total defeat, averted only because Hitler – in his way also a prisoner of illusions based upon the past – made compensating errors. He and Rundstedt halted their panzers before Dunkirk to preserve them for a breakthrough at "another battle of the Marne" which, despite all evidence, Hitler persisted in fearing would develop to the south.

From today's standpoint, the most disturbing part of the whole story is that the British were landed in this predicament, despite all the safeguards against poor leadership that exist in a working parliamentary democracy and despite the resources of the finest diplomatic and intelligence services in the world. Already in the 1930's it was clear that in the most vital decisions affecting national security, the decisions of peace and war, the people of a democracy were utterly dependent upon their leaders. They had neither sufficient information nor time or opportunity to check a fatal mistake of judgment. What was true in the 1930's applies *a fortiori* to the era of cold war and atomic weapons.

Biographers and historians, unable to believe that an ordinary man could dupe so many of the elect of the world – chancellors, prime ministers, field marshals, fellow dictators – have painted Hitler larger than life: an *evil* genius, to be sure, but a genius all the same. As the memoirs and diaries of Hitler's subordinates and the verbatim reports of his staff conferences and *causeries* accumulate, it has become devastatingly clear that he was a man of very ordinary, even inferior, intellectual power, of the coarsest nature, and semi-literate in the way that is worse than total illiteracy.

Hitler was extraordinary only in his manias, his insatiable hunger for power, and his criminal readiness to go to any lengths of deceit, treachery, and

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violence to get and keep power. He had not even the heroic virtues he professed to admire. The famous "iron will" served well enough for throwing away the lives of his soldiers in futile efforts to hold untenable positions, but did not induce him to visit his hard-pressed troops on the Eastern fronts once defeat had set in, or the distressed areas of air-raid damage where, despite Goebbels' urgent pleading, he refused to set foot. He could not bear to hear bad news and abused those whose duty it was to give him honest reports.

Ascetic in food and drink and probably sex, he was otherwise unself-disciplined and lazy, and led an unhealthy life. He kept irregular hours and left everything to be done in a last-minute fury of activity. He did not bother to concern himself with the details of the government of Germany and the occupied territories, with the result that corruption and inefficiency flourished and undermined the German war effort more than Allied bombs. For days at a time during crucial battles on both Eastern and Western fronts, he absented himself from his command headquarters and lounged in his house on the Obersalzberg.

Despite stupendous blunders in the Mediterranean and Eastern theaters of war, Hitler is frequently made out to have been a gifted military strategist. Apart from his windfall victories, the evidence offered for this is Hitler's insistence, against his generals' advice, on proceeding to the attack in the West after the defeat of Poland and his promotion of the use of fast-moving armor in blitzkrieg tactics. But even here, if Hitler had had his way and had attacked in the West in the fall of 1939, before Manstein's plan of launching the main armored force through the Ardennes was adopted, the German drive might very well have been contained by the French.

Hitler was no superman and Shirer makes it clear, I think, that he could and should have been toppled on the occasion of any one of a half-dozen of his wildest gambles and blunders. He was phenomenally lucky – lucky in the gullibility of those whom he duped and lucky in the incompetence of those who tried to oppose him along his way to mastery of Europe: Papen, Schleicher, Schacht and Thyssen who helped him trick his way into power; Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier, and Bonnet who handed him central Europe with its armaments and industrial resources; Stalin and Molotov who gave him his one-front war in the West and supplied him with raw materials to beat the blockade at sea; the generals and colonels of the German resistance whose staff work was equal to the conquest of all Europe, but not to taking over a few headquarters buildings and the radio and other communications in Berlin during the assassination attempt and uprising of July 20, 1944.

Mr. Shirer, CBS correspondent in Berlin during the Nazi era, evidently had the ambition to produce a scholarly, perhaps even the definitive history of the Third Reich. In the first aim, he has certainly succeeded. He could not, in the nature of things, succeed in the second. As he himself has said, it was impossible for him, and it may never be possible for anyone, to sift the hundreds of tons of documents left behind by the Nazis. (The captured records of the German foreign office alone ran to 485 tons!) Nor, except for a brief period in the thirties, has he touched on the social, economic and cultural aspects of the era. We are told in detail the mode, manner and statistics of the peoples' enslavement and persecution, but otherwise, the lives of the mass of the German and European peoples during these twelve years remain shadowy.

The First Snow

I had thought the snow might come today.
This morning the sky was a profound lavender
That clung like a half-translucent rubber tent
To the spiky dogwood at the end of the garden.
While I ate my breakfast
I watched a blue jay, turquoise
Against the deeply lucid lavender,
Chip fragments of ice from the birdbath with a beak
As stout as a chisel; my Brazilian coffee,
I thought, was a very unvaliant drink.
I remember wondering what sort of poem
One should offer to the winter's first snow.
But I didn't notice when the snow began.
At the point when afternoon lies suddenly
Like the Rosetta stone on a wordworker's neck,
I looked up and saw the flakes, swaying
And fluttering past my window. And when
I looked out I saw the ground
Already covered with a fragile white lace.
The minute sublimity of the snow, whitening
Each twig perfectly, recalling
Old snow-games,
Seemed cause enough for my sense of calm delight;
And yet I was aware also of something more,
A snow-sadness that underlay my pleasure; and sometimes
It seemed as if the snowflakes in disarray,
Advancing and kicking like chorus lines
At my window, were faintly derisive. I stood
For so long looking out, looking into
My snow-bewilderments,
That the cat, Tolliver, came and looked, too;
But only for a moment, and then turned his blank eyes
Into my face and went back to his chair.
And now I have written, no, not a poem,
Just a kind of footnote
To the long book of the snow.

HAYDEN CARRUTH

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Nevertheless, as a political and military history of the Nazi regime and Hitler's war, Shirer's achievement is a formidable one. For the first third of the book, he does little but follow such brilliant trail-blazers as the English historians John Wheeler-Bennett and Alan Bullock. But at about the time, 1934, when he himself arrived in Nazi Germany, he finds his stride. Drawing on the most recently published German and British documents, and such unpublished material as the diary of General Halder, chief of staff of the German army, he presents a fascinating and completely convincing account of the crises that led to the outbreak of war and the series of campaigns that followed it. His management of the massive material and a complex narrative is masterly. His judgment of when to anticipate the order of events in developing a theme and when to revert to strict chronology is unerring.

At one point, Shirer candidly remarks that he and the other foreign correspondents in Germany knew little at the time of what lay behind the surface of the events they described. This being so, I think he would have done well to leave out of this book comments (mostly on the weather) of the "I was there" variety. They add nothing to a serious work of history.

But these are small matters which can readily be put right in a later edition and do not, in any case, detract from the fundamental merits of the work.

Assault on the Pointless Life

by Saul Maloff

To those who regard statistics as the very emblem of reality, for whom scientific rigor is the index and guarantor of truth, it must seem that the free-lance social critic is a nuisance let loose among men who have serious work to do. To the academic questionnaire-sociologists, idolatrous of quantity and measurement, the unaffiliated free-lance critic will not have really *useful* things to say, and can be interesting only as a gifted amateur may be interesting – interesting but not *valuable*.

Growing Up Absurd
by Paul Goodman
(Random House; $4.50)

Our Visit to Niagara
by Paul Goodman
(Horizon; $3.95)

Partly because a view something like this prevails in academic sociology, there has developed in recent years an opposition underground operating on two fronts: what has been called "Kitsch" sociology, which is at best muckraking and at worst merely sensational; and an important tendency (alive mostly in some highbrow periodicals) which attempts not merely to describe the structure but to define the quality of American life and level against it a serious and thoroughgoing moral and aesthetic criticism. Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* is in the second of these categories. It is all prose, lively, eccentric, colloquial prose, twisted to his own odd shape, fanciful, scattered, digressive as the best talk often is; full of feeling, raging, lyrical, caustic, scathing, roaring mad; imaginative, even reckless, fertile of ideas and crazy salvationist schemes which make remarkable good sense. There is nothing objective here: it is all intensely personal.

In a way, the title is misleading, creating, as it does, the impression that the book is about the process of growing up, which it is not. Goodman is interested not in the process itself but in its end, in what the boy has around him to grow up *to*. Sartre speaks somewhere of an absurd world as one without ends of meaning and value; and it is in this sense that young people – juvenile delinquents and junior executives, poor and rich, hipsters and squares – grow up absurd. To describe the depredations and empty wastes of that absurdity, to convey the look and the feel of it, and to reckon its appalling cost, is the burden of the book.

Goodman has the artist's eye for the right detail, the revealing instance, the surprising and illuminating juxtaposition; a reliance upon lived and felt experience; and a passionate heart. After the abstractness, the deadness, of so much of academic sociology, it is exhilarating to find a critic who begins and ends with people, who keeps the human person at the center of his vision so that we see not the "dynamics of society," but the figure itself. That is his method, to walk through the landscape and point, to show the ends toward which we compel people to grow up.

The argument moves from what Goodman calls "missed revolutions" (processes begun and then either distorted from their objectives toward some end which is alien to the original purpose or simply abandoned, blocked) to our present predicament; missed revolutions which add up to a legacy of betrayal, to a society which is (to use his word) a racket – eclectic, phony, sensational, trivial, boring; one in which there is little useful work and therefore little genuine leisure – in a period which he sees as one of "transition, uprootedness, inhuman scale, technical abstractness, affectlessness, and conformity." It is a massive indictment, and it commands assent; if young people – by no means only the beat young or the delinquent – respond to their world and ours by becoming cynical, indifferent, disaffected, this book is the most persuasive account I know of why they do.

This is not simply another example of the criticism of "mass culture" in a

Finished *Enjoy, Enjoy!* ?

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

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J. F. Golay *is the author of* The Found-

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"mass society" (which is the form serious criticism took in the long interval during which there was hardly any criticism at all in this country); Goodman shares certain of its premises but ranges far beyond them, is more radical. His theme is that *"Growth, like any ongoing function, requires adequate objects in the environment* to meet the needs and capacities of the growing child, boy, youth, and young man, until he can better choose and make his own environment. It is not a 'psychological' question of poor influence and bad attitudes, but an objective question of real opportunities for worthwhile experience." He does not so much attack as dismiss the "psychology" of "adjustment" by facing it with what seems to him the crucial and dismantling question: adjustment to what? The "to what" is the substance of the book: ". . . Our abundant society is at present simply deficient in many of the most elementary objective opportunities and worthwhile goals that could make growing up possible. It is lacking in enough man's work. It is lacking in honest public speech, and people are not taken seriously. It is lacking in the opportunity to be useful. It thwarts aptitude and creates stupidity. It corrupts ingenuous patriotism. It corrupts the fine arts. It shackles science. It dampens animal ardor. It discourages the religious convictions of Justification and Vocation and it dims the sense that there is a Creation. It has no Honor. It has no Community."

If one sees less to hope for from alienated youth than does Goodman, indeed if one sees Goodman's hope as desperation, well, that's no great matter. He is, in the year 1960, unashamedly utopian, storming for excellence. If his terribly exacting demands do not receive the most urgent attention we can summon, it will be because we are staring fixedly at nothing much, because we cannot respond to demands.

But if Goodman brings to the work of social and cultural criticism the gifts of an artist to splendid effect, he comes to the art of the short story (in his book *Our Visit to Niagara*) too often as an analytic critic, and with disappointing results. The matter of the stories rises directly out of the preoccupations of *Growing Up Absurd*, is often a quasi-fictional treatment of them; but where it is marvelously appropriate in one, it is obtrusive and disconcerting in the other – insistently explicit, didactic, essayistic. Read in conjunction with *Growing Up Absurd*, the stories are disturbingly familiar, repetitive, yield no new light. But the book is a mixed lot. When he succeeds (as he does in some of the "American Stories," for example in the title story, and in "Bathers at Westover Pond"; and in some of the "Myths"), he succeeds brilliantly. At his best, he writes with exuberance, tremendous vitality and comes out somehow with a succession of startling imaginative achievements, of a kind that beautifully violates every known stricture of the well-made story. Unhappily, the level of his best fiction is not always achieved here.

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The Unquiet American in Paris

by Susan M. Black

I read about an interesting poll in the newspaper during the campaign, which found that the voters were 30 percent against Nixon, 30 percent against Kennedy and 40 percent undecided. The pollster was Art Buchwald from the Paris office of *The Herald Tribune*, who is now in this country to see if it can survive his reporting. *Don't Forget to Write* consists of 85 pieces divided into 8 sections beginning with "What's Nous" ("Nous" is a happy family of five: Buchwald, wife and three small expensive children – supplemented by friends and an occasional nanny or mother-in-law). The scene is usually Paris but Buchwald will go almost anywhere, by train, plane, letter, telephone or imagination.

Don't Forget to Write
by Art Buchwald
(World; $3.95)

Half a dozen of my dozen and a half favorites are "Old Soldiers Never Die" (they just write their memoirs); "Our leading Hostess" (in which a lady named Elsa who is much sought out for bizarre events wonders why, as "I'm not as beautiful as Truman Capote, I'm not as rich as Orson Welles, and I'm not as young as Gary Cooper."); "The National Sport" (Far Rumpre, translation: make noise). [illegible]

nism

ngs about Arthur Laurents' latest opus are probably in excess of the event. It is an under-nourished little romance, and were it performed under more appropriate circumstances (say, at the annual dinner for the female staff writers of *Modern True Love Stories*), I might be able to summon up a less impassioned response (say, a muted sound from the depths of my internal organs). It is, however, a Moderate Broadway Hit, which means that it has achieved a certain sanction from the people who support our theater. And since underneath all the frozen custard, confectionary sprinkles, and artificial fudge flavoring in the plot, there is a rotten cashew nut disguised as a "serious" idea, I am forced into the absurd position of treating *Invitation to a March* as if there were something weighty it was trying to say.

The fault is not entirely mine. It is the author who introduces such pretensions – though, to be sure, rather haphazardly. After declaiming in ringing Ibsenite tones that he is treating "the problem of individualism, of standing up against the forces that try to fashion

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be a land of magic. When the curtain goes up the audience should be in fairyland." Out of this schizoid commitment comes a modern version of the Sleeping Beauty legend as seen through the eyes of the society columnist for the Fire Island *Times:* Mr. Laurents' stage fairies live on expensive vacation beaches, wear a variety of tasteless costumes ranging from purple toreador slacks to Chinese red sports coats, dye their hair blue, engage in atrocious witticisms, and throw confetti all over themselves in moments of ecstasy. As for the "forces that fashion," these turn out to be nothing but mothers – a whole stage-full of mothers – all contending for the anemic little soul of a young debutante so bored with life she tends to fall asleep in the middle of cocktails: two evil mothers who want her to join the "march" of conventional existence ("martinis at seven, breakfast at eight, dinner at nine"), and a good one who offers her the "dance" of "doing what you want." There are also a couple of fairy princes, one stuffy, principled, and rich (dressed in evening clothes), the other carefree, illegitimate, and poor (dressed in a tee shirt, cowboy boots, and tight pants). I'll leave it to you to guess who wakes her up, to the accompaniment of string music and flying confetti.

As for Mr. Laurents' concept of "nonconformity," this is about as advanced as his plot. Watered down to soap bubbles, it is expressed through the character of the good mother who really *responds* to visual delights ("Look at that evening – Goddamn nature!"), and who disturbs her neighbors with such audacious acts as calling herself Camille Jablonski, "an Un-American name"), swimming naked in the ocean ("it's nasty") and fostering an illegitimate child ("a bitch mother breeds a bastard son"). This staggering assault on non-existent conventions is apparently so winning that it inspires the heroine to wear an afternoon dress at an evening party and (in one climactic moment) to drink a martini at an improper hour in the day. Not content merely to shock the audience with such daring activities, Mr. Laurents (who considers himself a non-conformist playwright) introduces a "new," "different," and "disturbing" technical innovation into his work: "In my play the actors speak to the audience." And so they do. Of such stuff is Broadway non-conformism made.

Unfortunately, Mr. Laurents not only shares this "innovation" with eight or ten of his Broadway colleagues, but employs it for precisely the same effect: to keep the audience in a perpetual state of self-satisfied euphoria. As a playwright, Mr. Laurents has already flattered his spectators into thinking they too are unconventional; as a director, he busses them even more with the sly winks, ingratiating poses, and grinning asides of his performers. I suppose I should be grateful to Celeste Holm for sparing me the ordeal of Shelley Winters in the part of Camille, but her performance is so soaked in flat-footed, open-eyed, sugar-voiced good fellowship that I found it almost impossible to watch: Jane Fonda, evoking the Beauty by languidly draping herself over a variey of beach furniture, is most impressive in absolute repose (*i.e.* when she is asleep); and Eileen Heckart and Madeleine Sherwood, as the malevolent mothers, labor unsuccessfully to preserve a little authenticity in an atmosphere alien to truth, art, or life. *Invitation to a March,* like so many Broadway plays which emasculate serious ideas, is merely another horrible chapter in that dismal chronicle of the American bourgeois mind which is everyday being written on our commercial stage.

The Phoenix is now doing *She Stoops to Conquer,* and I find myself with little to add to my earlier observations. Like all their performances, the current one is respectable, conventional, occasionally amusing, ultimately rather deadly. Goldsmith's 18th Century paean to the good nature of man is hardly the most sprightly play of that period, but it is certainly more robust than now appears. Except for Gerry Jedd who is contributing a rich, rounded, and versatile performance as Kate Hardcastle, the Phoenix actors are all playing as if dipped in Novocain. When an actor as gifted as John Heffernan begins to share in the general lassitude, I must conclude that Stuart Vaughan is putting the company to sleep. It will remain asleep, too, along with the audience, until some more energetic director is permitted to revive it. I cast my vote for Gerald Freedman.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

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Correspondence

Our Men in Havana

Sirs:

Samuel Shapiro's letter (October 3) contains even more glaring inaccuracies about our subsidiary, Moa Bay Mining Company, than his article "Cuba" (September 12).

His letter first states that "neither the Batista Government nor Moa Bay officials ever made public the details of the special tax treatment granted the company." Let Mr. Shapiro refer to the *Gaceta Oficial de La Republic de Cuba* (Official Gazette) of August 23, 1957. This entirely public document, in which official Cuban governmental action is set forth and so becomes effective, on that date published in full on pages 16447 and 16463 the tax resolution for our project. Mr. Shapiro apparently failed to consult this standard, official and obvious source of information, nor did he bother to consult either of two other obvious sources – Freeport Sulphur Company or Moa Bay Mining Company. He would have been, and still is, quite welcome to our copy of the *Gaceta Oficial* – in the original Spanish or in translation.

Mr. Shapiro's use of the word "special" to define our tax treatment is also erroneous. We did not receive any special treatment or any benefit pursuant to special legislation. We simply applied for and, after a year of review by numerous governmental and other agencies which were concerned, were granted in 1957 the partial tax exemptions allowed any new industry for a limited time under Law-Decree 1038 of 1953. Many industries received such exemptions; indeed, some received them under the Castro government.

I might add that the passage of a year's time between our application and its acceptance is not extraordinary in view of the fact that the Moa Bay project was the largest private industrial venture in Cuba's history and that its tax status had to be reviewed by, among others, the Ministry of Agriculture, the National Economic Council, the Cuban Chamber of Commerce, and the National Association of Industrialists.

With regard to the Cuban magazine *Bohemia's* "specific charge that Ambassador Smith used his influence on behalf of Moa Bay," we advised *Bohemia's* publisher, Sr. Quevedo, at the time that the story was in error. He could not and did not corroborate the story. Further, the author of the article, Sr. Carlos Casteneda, was questioned as to his sources, and Sr. Casteneda admitted that the story was based only on a rumor which he had heard and thought plausible.

Mr. Shapiro's final paragraph says: "If Moa Bay really got its tax reduction without political or diplomatic pressure, and without the distribution of money in the right places (and Carrington does not say that it did), this was an example of generosity almost without parallel in the history of Cuba."

The parenthetical remark in this paragraph is a remarkable example of backhanded innuendo. I did not say that Moa Bay got its partial exemption "without the distribution of money in the right places," because, until Mr. Shapiro's letter appeared, our company had not been accused of such action. I now state, for Mr. Shapiro's future reference, that Moa Bay obtained its new industry tax exemption without the distribution of money, and I repeat that it did so without political or diplomatic pressure. As to whether this adds up to unparalleled generosity on the part of Cuba, I refer you to the statement above that we, like many other new industries in Cuba, received our exemptions within the framework of existing law designed to stimulate industrial development. It might be pointed out, indeed, that this policy of encouraging new industry was inaugurated by the Cuban Government under Decree 2144 of August 7, 1945, which pre-dated Batista's regime and which likewise provided tax exemptions.

In sum, there is no ground for Mr. Shapiro's accusation-by-innuendo against our company. Mr. Shapiro himself presents no evidence to support the accusation. Regardless of what view is held of the Castro government, the repetition of unfounded charges based on hearsay is, at best, unfair and irresponsible journalism; and I request that a proper retraction be made.

John C. Carrington
Freeport Sulphur Company

In Reply:

I am happy to accept Mr. Carrington's

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assurance, but as both he and Ambassador Smith have denied that the Ambassador used political or diplomatic pressure to secure the grant of new-industry tax status to the Moa Bay operation, it may be pertinent to quote the notice that appeared in *The New York Times* on August 17, 1957:

"Work on a project for mining and refining nickel and cobalt at Moa Bay in Oriente Province will start immediately, the Presidential Palace said today. The announcement was made following talks by Earl E. T. Smith, United States Ambassador, L. M. Williams, President of Freeport Sulphur Company and other officials of the enterprise with President Fulgencio Batista.

"About $75,000,000 will be invested in the Moa Bay project, officials said. The way was cleared for the start of construction when President Batista granted the project a classification as a new industry with tax exemption. Production is scheduled to begin within two years."

I cannot, of course, vouch for the accuracy of the *New York Times* report, but so far as I know, neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. Williams corrected this report at the time.

Ambassador Smith did not, of course, receive any financial benefits from the Moa Bay concession; he did not then or later hold any stock in Freeport Sulphur. But since his predecessor, Arthur Gardner, had been criticized for the open support he gave Batista, I believe it should be said that Mr. Smith showed poor judgment in interceding with the dictator on behalf of an American company seeking a tax concession. But then, Mr. Smith was a political appointee with no previous diplomatic experience. He had contributed $3,800 to the Republican campaign chest in 1956, and served as Finance Chairman of the Republican State Committee in Florida, but he knew little about Cuban affairs and did not speak Spanish. As the civil war which was to overthrow Batista was already in full swing, the interests of the United States in Cuba would have been better served by the appointment to Havana of an experienced career diplomat.

Samuel Shapiro
Rochester, Michigan

Was Getlein Kidding?

Sirs:

I am more than a little puzzled by Mr. Getlein's article (October 24), "A Protestant for President?". Was this tongue in cheek, or is Mr. Getlein oblivious to the fact that he is wild as a March hare? To imply that The Power of Positive Thinking is localized within Protestantism and is its chief characteristic theologically, is slick but not true. This kind of pietism is a reflection of American culture and is a part not only of the whole Christian community, but the Jewish and secular as well. American culture is not Christian but secular, and if one Christian minister preaches secular pietism and becomes famous and wealthy for it, why draw large conclusions about theological corruption of American Christianity?

As for the private secondary schools of New England being the incarnation of the "Protestant threat," would it not be just as cute – and equally unjustified – to shake our finger at the large state universities as representing the "Secular threat"? . . . Mr. Getlein's description of the "power structure" with the Episcopalians on top and the Baptists on the bottom is certainly a convenient analysis for the simple-minded, but is it true?

As for the House of Windsor occupying the White House, I'll take Elizabeth and Philip over Pat and Dick as far as looks go. I presume this is the level on which Mr. Getlein operates.

Claudius Miller, Rector
Church of the Good Shepherd
St. Louis, Mo.

Sirs:

I was disappointed to note in the November 7 issue that the only comment you had received, or thought worth printing, on Frank Getlein's delightful spoof "A Protestant for President" came from a reader who missed the point entirely and darkly suspects that *The New Republic* staff – if the deplorable Mr. Getlein is an example – is against Harvard College and spends its days off in drinking and gambling. Is it possible that New Republic readers are so hag-ridden by these troublous times that they can no longer savor a kernel of truth when it is served with a sauce of wit?

Leila Engel
Bloomington Indiana

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

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

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